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Recent Cases

Owner of Joint Checking Account Protected Against
Deceptive Collection Practices
by MargaretM. Ogarek
In Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider,S.C., 111 F.3d
1322 (7th Cir. 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in a case of first
impression, affirmed the application
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA" or "the Act") 15
U.S.C. § 1692 (West 1997) to thirdparty collectors of dishonored
checks. In expanding the reach of
the FDCPA, the Seventh Circuit
rejected Defendant's assertion that
the FDCPA only covers debts
"arising from an offer or extension
of credit."

Plaintiff Argued Collection
Agent's Letter Violated the
FDCPA
Joe Arsenault wrote a $156.94
check from a joint checking account
to pay for groceries at a local
supermarket. Arsenault and Plaintiff,
Teri L. Bass, owned the account.
The check bounced, and the grocery
store hired Defendant Stolper,
Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider,
S.C. ("SKBN") to collect payment
from Arsenault. In its attempt to
collect the grocery bill from
Arsenault, SKBN mailed three
collection letters addressed solely to
Arsenault. However, Arsenault did
not respond to these letters. Subsequently, Defendant Kathy
Leschensky, an employee of SKBN,
wrote and mailed a fourth letter
addressed to both Arsenault and
Bass. Leschensky claimed in the
letter that, "'she drafted and filed
lawsuits in collection matters, and
that she would [refrain from such
action] ... if Bass or Arsenault
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would make arrangements to pay."
In response to the letter, Plaintiff
initiated proceedings for damages
based on Leschensky's failure to
conform the fourth collection letter
to the requirements established by
the FDCPA. Specifically, Plaintiffs
alleged that Leschensky misrepresented herself as an attorney and
failed to include certain language
required by the FDCPA regarding
her purpose for writing the letter.
The district court granted
Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. The court held that the
FDCPA applied to third parties
collecting on dishonored checks, and
the fourth collection letter sent to
Plaintiffs violated the FDCPA. On
appeal, Defendants did not contest
that their collection practices
violated the FDCPA. They only
argued that a dishonored check did
not constitute a "debt" according to
the FDCPA and thus, they were not
subject to the FDCPA's requirements.

forms of obligations as "debts," the
issue before the appellate court was
whether the payment obligation
created by a dishonored check
created a "debt" within the purview
of the FDCPA.

FDCPA Enacted to Remedy
Debt Collector Abuse

Court Relied on PlainMeaning Reading of the
Statute

On September 20, 1977, President Carter signed the FDCPA as an
amendment to the Consumer Credit
Protection Act ("CCPA") 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (West 1997). The purpose of
the amendment is to protect unwitting consumers from "abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection
practices, including threats of
violence, use of obscene language,
certain contacts with acquaintances
of the consumer, late night phone
calls, and simulated legal process."
The FDCPA prohibits these practices
in the collection of "debts." Since
the FDCPA does not classify all

The court began its analysis by
examining the statutory definition of
debt. The FDCPA defines a debt as:
any obligation or alleged
obligation of a consumer to
pay money arising out of a
transaction in which the
money, property, insurance, or
services which are the subject
of the transaction are primarily
for personal, family, or
household purposes, whether
or not such obligation has
been reduced to judgment.

Defendants Contended
Checks Were Not Debts
Covered by the FDCPA
Defendants argued that only
transactions involving an "offer or
extension of credit" result in debt
regulated by the FDCPA. Further,
Defendants argued that checks did
not constitute an offer or extension
of credit, and as such, collection
practices on dishonored checks were
not governed by the FDCPA.
Plaintiff rebutted this argument,
contending that neither the language
nor the legislative history of the
FDCPA supported Defendants'
argument that only debts involving
an extension of credit were within
the purview of the statute.

Loyola University Chicago School of Law 9 325

The court found no language in
the FDCPA's definition of debt that
supported Defendants' argument that
an extension of credit was required
to constitute a debt under the statute.
To the contrary, the court stated that
there was a "complete lack of
textual support in the Act for...
[Defendants'] argument."
In reaching this conclusion, the
court first looked to the phrase "any
obligation to pay." The court found
this definition unambiguous and
stated that "such absolute language"
could not be construed to encompass
only a certain type of obligation.
The court concluded that according
to the statutory language, "as long as
a transaction creates an obligation to
pay, a debt is created." Furthermore,
since "transaction" is not otherwise
defined in the statute, the court,
following rules of statutory construction, afforded transaction its
"ordinary meaning." This ordinary
meaning of transaction is broad and
not limited to only credit transactions as Defendants had argued.
Because of the statute's lack of
ambiguity, the court "was powerless
to rewrite the Act's definition of
'debt' and therefore held that an
extension of credit was not required
for an obligation to be a "debt"
under the statute.

Court Seeks Further
Support for its Decision
Even though the court reached its
holding half-way through its
opinion, basing its decision on a
plain-meaning reading of the
FDCPA, the court examined other
sources to gamer support for its
holding.
First, the court examined case
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law from the Third Circuit. Defendants relied upon Zimmerman v.
HBO Affiliate Group, 834 E2d 1163
(3d Cir. 1987), to support their
contention that debt under the statute
required an extension of credit. In
Zimmerman, the court held that a
cable company's demand of payment for the use of allegedly pirated
cable television stations did not meet
the requirements of debt collection
under the FDCPA. In reaching this
decision, the Zimmerman court
concluded, without discussion, that
the definition of debt under the
FDCPA is the same as the definition
of debt under the other subchapters
of the CCPA: debt is an extension
of credit to a consumer.
The court in the instant case
rejected the Zimmerman court's
definition of debt and chose to
"respectfully part ways" with the
Third Circuit. The Seventh Circuit
criticized the Third Circuit's failure
to consider the plain language of the
statute or the statute's legislative
history. Further, the court dismissed
the Third Circuit's (and the Defendants') reliance on the FDCPA's
codification within the CCPA in
defining debt, stating "Congress' [s]
choice of statutory structure as
evidence of intent is unnecessary
given the Act's clear textual definition of the term 'debt."' Also, the
FDCPA is a "self-contained,
functionally complete act" with its
own definitions and purposes and
requires no cross-referencing to
other chapters of the CCPA. For
these reasons, the court in the instant
case found the Zimmerman decision
unpersuasive.
In addition to considering the
plain language of the FDCPA and
discounting the Zimmerman case,

the court also found support for its
holding from legislative history.
Specifically, the Act's history
showed that Congress considered
this very issue and rejected a more
restrictive definition of debt. In
addition, several debaters in the
House of Representatives and
Senate hearings recognized that a
dishonored check created a debt.
Based on Congress's consideration
of this issue, the court refused to
believe that Congress's decision to
exclude "credit extension" as part of
the definition of debt was an
accident. Finally, the legislative
history also contained a clear
statement of intent on the issue:
"[tihe committee intends that the
term 'debt' include[s] consumer
obligations paid by check or other
non-credit consumer obligations."
For these reasons, the court found
support for its holding that for debts
to fall within the purview of the
FDCPA, no extension of credit is
required.

Court Rejected Defendants'
Final Argument
At the end of the court's opinion,
the Court discussed the arguments
Defendants raised "in their final
attempt to excuse their prohibited
collection practices." Specifically,
Defendants argued that dishonored
checks are not debts under the
FDCPA because a dishonored check
is a "criminal and tortious act, not a
consumer credit transactions [sic]."
The court found that not all dishonored checks are fraudulent, and
therefore, rejected Defendants'
contention that these checks are not
covered by the statute.
Because the Court rejected
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Defendants' fraud argument, it did
not need to address whether fraudulent intent of the check writer should
make a difference in the outcome of
this case. Specifically, the court did
not decide whether a fraud exception
existed or whether such an exception
would remove dishonored check
collections from the purview of the
statute. Nevertheless, the court
expressed strong disapproval for a
fraud exception as a violation of the
spirit of the FDCPA. "The Act's
singular focus is on curbing abusive
and deceptive collection practices,
not abusive and deceptive consumer
payment practices." The court noted
that current legal redresses sufficiently remedy debtor fraud, and
spumed the creation of a judicial
exception that "selectively gives a
green light to the very abuses
proscribed by the Act."

Judge Bauer Dissented

Editor's Note

In his dissent, Judge Bauer was
unconvinced that the seller's
acceptance of a check constituted a
creditor-debtor relationship. In the
absence of such a credit relationship,
Plaintiff should not enjoy the
FDCPA's protections. In addition,
Judge Bauer contended that the
majority understated the reasoning
of Zimmerman, stating that a seller
who accepts a check in a "goodsfor-money" transaction consents to
receiving nothing less than money.
Judge Bauer explained that the
debtor who provided a dishonored
check paralleled the thief involved
in shoplifting because the debtor
removed the consent element from
the transaction. Accordingly, a
dishonored check should not be
afforded the protection of the
FDCPA.

Recently, in Charles v. Lundgren
&Assoc., 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
1997), the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Seventh Circuit that a bad check
constitutes a debt under the FDCPA.
Citing Bass v. Stolper,Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, the court stated
"we agree with its conclusion that,
because 'an offer or extension of
credit is not required for payment
obligation to constitute a 'debt'
under the FDCPA,' the FDCPA
governs the collection of dishonored
checks."

Federal Tobacco Labeling Laws do not Preempt
State Law Requiring Additive and Nicotine
Disclosure
by Irene Kowalczyk
In Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Harshbarger, Nos. 97-8022, 978023, 1997 WL 458881 (1st Cir.
Aug. 18, 1997), the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling
that neither the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, as
amended (the "FCLAA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-41, nor the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 (the "Smokeless
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Tobacco Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 440108, preempts the Massachusetts
Disclosure Act (the "Disclosure
Act"), MAss. GEN. LAWS CH. 94, §
307B. The court held that the federal
statutes do not expressly or impliedly preempt the state statute,
which requires cigarette and
smokeless tobacco manufacturers to
make certain disclosures to the
public health department.
Preemption analysis is based on

the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which invalidates state laws in conflict with
federal laws. Generally, federal law
does not supersede the states' police
powers unless federal preemption is
Congress's intent is "clear and
manifest." Congressional intent
may be either expressed in the
federal statute's language or implied
in its purpose. If there is no explicit
preemption language, the federal act
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